Moralized Health-Related Persuasion Undermines Social Cohesion by Täuber, Susanne
  
 University of Groningen






IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2018
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Täuber, S. (2018). Moralized Health-Related Persuasion Undermines Social Cohesion. Frontiers in
Psychology, 9, [909]. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00909
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
fpsyg-09-00909 June 8, 2018 Time: 16:37 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
















This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 21 November 2017
Accepted: 18 May 2018
Published: 12 June 2018
Citation:








Department of Human Resource Management & Organizational Behavior, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Integrating theory and research on persuasion, moralization, and intergroup relations,
the present research aims to highlight the far-reaching impact of health-related
persuasion on society. I propose that governments’ health-related persuasion leads
to the emergence of new social norms, and in particular moral norms. Importantly,
moral norms provide strong behavioral imperatives and are seen as binding for group
members. This suggests that moralized persuasion has a strong potential to divide
society along the lines of citizens who conform to and citizens who deviate from
health-related moral norms. Thus, departing from the traditional focus on targets of
persuasion, the present research focuses on those holding a moralized view on health
and lifestyle. Key aspects of social cohesion as defined by the OECD (2011) have
been tested across four studies. The main hypothesis tested is that those conforming
to the norm (e.g., non-smokers, normal weight people, people with healthy lifestyles)
will stigmatize those deviating from the norm (e.g., smokers, overweight people,
people with unhealthy lifestyles). Flowing from stigmatization, less inclusion, lower
solidarity with and greater endorsement of unequal treatment of those deviating from
the moral norm are predicted. Four survey studies (total N = 1568) examining the
proposed associations among non-smokers, normal weight people, and employees
with healthy lifestyles are presented. The studies provide unanimous support for the
hypothesis, with meta-analysis providing further support for the reliability of the findings.
Consistent across studies, social cohesion indicators were negatively affected by
health moralization through stigmatization of those deviating from health-related moral
norms. Findings highlight an under-acknowledged potential of moralized health-related
persuasion to divide society, thereby undermining cohesion and the achievement of
important societal goals. In the discussion, limitations and relevant routes for future
research are highlighted. Recommendations are derived for policy makers, institutions,
employers, and individuals.
Keywords: persuasion, moralization, categorization, solidarity, social exclusion, unequal treatment
INTRODUCTION
Persuasion is an important part of our lives. We are confronted with messages to make us
buy a certain product, vote for political parties, or live our life in a certain way. At the
same time, we try to persuade the people around us constantly, trying to convince them
of our own opinion, to drop certain unhealthy habits, or to join certain groups. Given its
pervasiveness, it is not surprising that the study of persuasion lies at the heart of diverse research
areas, ranging from social psychology and the political sciences to advertising and marketing
research (Knowles and Linn, 2004). Thus far, research and theorizing concerning persuasion
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overwhelmingly focused on those targeted by the persuasive
message (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Olson and Zanna,
1993; Wood, 2000). The question how persuasion affects those
already complying with the desired behavior or attitude has
received little to no attention. I propose that this question is
particularly relevant when persuasion is moralized and addresses
large collectives of people, because in such contexts, persuasion
likely leads to the emergence of new moral norms. In line with
this proposition, the aim of this paper is threefold. The first
aim is to situate persuasion in the realm of emergent moral
norms, thereby carving out its relevance for intra- and intergroup
dynamics. In order to achieve this aim, the present paper diverges
from the traditional focus of considering the effects of persuasion
on the targets, focusing instead on those already complying
with the behavior at the heart of the persuasive message. The
second aim is empirically test the key hypothesis derived from the
above perspective, namely that those complying with a moralized
health-related norm will be less inclusive toward, express less
solidarity with, endorse unequal treatment of, and be more
exclusionary and discriminatory toward those not complying
with this norm. Finally, based on the theoretical rationale and
empirical findings presented, the third aim is to derive practical
recommendations as well as suggestions for relevant future
research.
Persuasion Can Lead to the Emergence
of Moral Norms
When thinking about persuasion, the most prominent examples
coming to mind probably concern marketing, where the
acquisition of certain products stands central. Research shows
that people are equipped with a range of strategies to resist such
messages (e.g., Sagarin et al., 2002; Knowles and Linn, 2004;
Fransen et al., 2015). Knowles and Linn (2004) contend that
resistance is a precondition for persuasion, because “without
resistance, persuasion, like preaching to the choir, is unnecessary
babble” (p. vii). Importantly, when marketing is concerned,
strategies to resist persuasion are commonly conceived of as
properties of a person (e.g., Fransen et al., 2015). For instance,
White and Dahl (2007) show that consumers have negative
associations with brands that are used by people they do not wish
to be associated with. Thus, the brand of the car one drives, the
soft drink one prefers or the phone one uses can serve as the basis
for distinguishing oneself from other individuals (Hollenbeck
and Kaikati, 2012).
A more recent development is governments’ efforts to
persuade entire populations to change their lifestyles. While
being similar to marketing in its aim to achieve attitude and
behavioral change, one distinct feature differentiating it from
other forms of persuasion is its potential for creating new
social norms. Specifically, rather than providing categorizations
based on individual preferences such as concerning one’s car or
phone, this form of persuasion leads to categorization based on
conformity to or deviance from a societal norm. This also implies
that resisting or being persuaded by such a message will no longer
be perceived as a property of an individual, but as a property of
a group member. Thus, while the car one drives or the phone
one uses will be perceived as a matter of personal choice and
preference, conformity to or deviance from an emerging group
norm will be perceived as a matter of one’s relation with the group
(Ellemers and van den Bos, 2012). As a consequence, effects of
persuasion will be manifest not only at the individual, but also at
the group level.
Moreover, persuasion concerning lifestyle and health will not
evoke just any norm. For several reasons which I will detail below,
persuasion concerning health and lifestyle is likely to evoke a
moral norm. Consider the example of the Dutch government,
which announced the transition of the traditional welfare state
to a so called participatory society in the address of the King
(Troonrede, 2013). In the note to the people, a strong focus
is put on own responsibility for living and aging healthily. At
the same time, harm caused to society by not living healthy is
reiterated in public discourse and the media. This is done in
particular by highlighting that money spent on health care costs
cannot be spent on better education or infrastructure (Verschoor,
2015). Thus, not only are those living unhealthily depicted as
harming society by incurring costs, these costs are also framed as
a zero-sum conflict of interest. Prior research demonstrated that
a focus on own responsibility and harming others are elements
of communication that evoke considerations of the issue in
questions in terms of morality (Rozin, 1999; Mulder, 2008).
Further, salience of zero-sum conflicts of interest is an important
element of moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990).
The Specificity of Moral Norms
Before considering the impact of moral norms on relations
between people in more detail, it is important to critically reflect
on the general assumption that public debate and governmental
persuasion can lead to the emergence of new moral norms.
We are inherently social beings and our survival depends on
living in groups (De Waal, 1996). Moral norms are a crucial
tool to reinforce behavioral norms within groups (Ellemers
and van den Bos, 2012). Such norms do not, by any means,
exclusively concern universal morals. Rather, different groups can
simply label certain behaviors as morally right or wrong, thereby
regulating individual group members’ behavior in an effective
way (Ellemers and van den Bos, 2012). Thus, a behavior that
is considered moral by one group might be considered neutral
or even immoral by another group (Ellemers and van den Bos,
2012). This surprisingly arbitrary nature of moral norms has been
demonstrated repeatedly in a variety of studies using different
approaches. For instance, Van Bavel et al. (2012) showed that
people are capable of construing diverse issues in moral and non-
moral terms, flexibly shifting their evaluation of the issue on a
trial-to-trial basis. Similarly, Wright et al. (2008, Study 1) asked
participants to classify 40 diverse issues ranging from exercising
over honesty to the death penalty as moral or non-moral. None
of those issues was unanimously classified as moral, and only one
was classified as non-moral by all participants.
The review above suggests that virtually any issue or
behavior can be perceived as a moral imperative, simply
based on individual convictions, group norms, or experimenter
instructions. But issues can also lose or gain moral connotations
over the course of time, a process called moralization when an
issue is increasingly viewed as moral or amoralization when an
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issue is increasingly viewed as non-moral. Rozin (1999) described
these processes using cigarette smoking (Rozin and Singh, 1999)
and vegetarianism (Rozin et al., 1997) as examples for issues
that shifted from being perceived as an individual choice to
being moralized in the past decades. Relatedly, divorce and
homosexuality shifted from being moralized to being perceived
as a personal preference over the past decades (Rozin, 1999).
Interestingly, Rozin (1999, p. 220) observed that people often
try to establish claims of new moral values, but that “most such
claims fade away without producing much of a ripple.” Thus, why
would health and lifestyle emerge as a new moralized norm rather
than fading away? The answer is probably that health and lifestyle
involve all the factors that have been identified as facilitating
moralization. Factors facilitating successful moralization are
perceptions that the behavior in question is under people’s self-
control and they are thus responsible for showing or not showing
the behavior and that the behavior elicits unwarranted harm
on others (Rozin, 1999; Mulder, 2008). In addition to this,
Rozin (1999) contends that lasting moralization is particularly
likely for behaviors associated with stigmatized and marginalized
groups. In light of those facilitating factors, health appears to
be a prime candidate for moralization. With healthy and fit
bodies being seen as indicative of self-control, self-denial, and
willpower (Bisogni et al., 2002), self-control is an issue deeply
ingrained in the health domain. Public debate focusing on
citizens’ responsibility to live healthily underlines the (presumed)
controllability of health outcomes. Moreover, unhealthy lifestyles
and poor health outcomes are disproportionately associated with
and statistically more prevalent among those with lower socio-
economic status and those with a migratory background (e.g.,
Adler and Ostrove, 1999). Put differently, unhealthy lifestyles
and poor health outcomes demonstrate a link with stigmatized
and marginalized groups, thereby fulfilling another factor that
makes moralization of health more likely. Finally, framing poor
health outcomes in terms of incurring costs on society makes
harm inflicted on the collective salient. All these factors feed
into health being an exceptionally well-suited domain for lasting
moralization on a societal level. Importantly, once a behavior
has become moralized, it is perceived as binding for the group
(Ellemers and van den Bos, 2012). Thus, whether one is deemed a
respected group member with an esteemed social image depends
on whether one conforms to the moral norms of the group one
belongs to. The next section considers the impact of moral norms
on social relationships in more detail.
The Impact of Moral Norms on Intra- and
Intergroup Processes
Moral norms are imperative for our living in groups (De Waal,
1996) and group identity is defined by shared moral norms
(Ellemers and van den Bos, 2012). Moral norms dictate what
“good” people should do (Haidt, 2001), and consequently regulate
individual group members’ behavior in groups, their standing
within the group, and how respected they are (Ellemers et al.,
2008). It follows logically that those violating a moral norm seen
as binding and defining for the group cannot, by definition, be
good group members. This division into moral and immoral
others might be considered functional from an evolutionary point
of view. For instance, others’ morality is considered particularly
relevant for survival (Wojciszke, 1994, 2005; De Waal, 1996)
and humans indeed appear to be particularly sensitive to cues
of immorality in others (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014, 2015).
This aligns with Error Management Theory (Haselton and Buss,
2000), which posits that in the moral domain, false positives
(incorrectly assuming the other is moral) are costlier than false
negatives (incorrectly assuming the other is immoral). Further,
negative behaviors are perceived as more diagnostic than positive
behaviors in the moral domain, while this pattern is reversed
in the competence domain (Skowronski and Carlston, 1987,
1989). Thus, not only will people be more alert concerning
indicators of immorality in others, once they have actually
found such indicators, these will be incredibly difficult to
correct for (Skowronski and Carlston, 1992). Finally, drawing
on the functional perspective, recent research demonstrated that
morality is another fundamental social category along which
people spontaneously categorize others (van Leeuwen et al.,
2012).
The above considerations suggest that generally, dividing
one’s social environment into those conforming to and those
deviating from moral norms is functional and benefits our
survival and successful group living. However, in conjunction
with the finding that virtually any behavior can be construed
in moral terms, such a division can easily emerge from more
or less arbitrary features. In such cases, I would argue that
the negative consequences of dividing the world into morally
good and morally bad people outweigh the potential benefits
thereof. This is because being considered immoral has much
more serious consequences than being considered, for instance,
incompetent. These insights are based on different lines of theory
and research as introduced above, but also on extensive research
into moral convictions conducted by Skitka et al. (2005) and
Skitka (2010). Moral convictions refer to “a strong and absolute
belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral”
(Skitka and Mullen, 2002, p. 36). While moral convictions have
positive potential in that they are major motivational catalysts
for social action (van Zomeren et al., 2011, 2012; Täuber et al.,
2015), there is also a dark side to them, as discovered over the
past years. For instance, people have been shown to perceive
their moral convictions as imperative for others’ behavior and
are unwilling to compromise (Skitka et al., 2015). Naturally,
this has consequences for how people view others who hold
divergent attitudes. Because moral issues are seen as a non-
negotiable truth, they generate an expectation of consensus from
others – thus, that everybody should agree with me (Wright
et al., 2013). It is this expectation which, according to Wright
et al. (2013, p. 37), “makes anyone who disagrees an outsider:
an outgroup member worthy of rebuke.” Consistent with this,
Haidt et al. (2003) showed that college students, while generally
valuing demographic diversity, reported significantly lower desire
to interact with other who differed from them regarding moral
values. These findings suggest that, to the extent that people
view a behavior in moral terms, they are likely to stigmatize
those not complying with the behavior. More specifically, viewing
health as a moral issue is expected to be associated with greater
expression of negative attitudes toward those who are seen as
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transgressing the moral norm. Stigmatization processes refer to
the ascription of negative attributes to individuals, which are
often behaviourally followed by social distance, discrimination,
and exclusion (e.g., Link and Phelan, 2001; Sikorski et al., 2015).
Similar to research on stigmatization (e.g., Link and Phelan,
2001; Sikorski et al., 2012, 2015), also research into moral
convictions demonstrates a strong association between attitudes
and behavior. For instance, moral mandates – which refer to the
readiness to take action based on moral convictions – have been
shown to be used to justify “any number of extreme actions”
in order to achieve the desired outcome (Skitka and Mullen,
2002, p. 39). These findings do not hold for moral convictions
alone. Wright et al. (2008) showed that simply believing an
issue to have a moral connotation made people more intolerant
toward others with a diverging attitude. Relatedly, Van Bavel
et al. (2012) concluded that, compared to non-moral evaluations,
moral evaluations of the same action were faster, more extreme,
and more strongly associated with the belief that absolutely
nobody or everybody should engage in this action. In sum,
research consistently demonstrates that attitudinal divergence
on moral, as compared to non-moral, issues elicits higher
intolerance (Haidt et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2005; Wright et al.,
2008). Such intolerance involves greater preferred social and
physical distance from attitudinally dissimilar others (Haidt et al.,
2003; Wright et al., 2008), more extreme evaluations (Van Bavel
et al., 2012), lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in
attitudinally heterogeneous groups, and a greater inability to
generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements (Skitka
et al., 2005).
Summarizing the above, the moralization of health might thus
undermine important indicators of social cohesion. According to
the OECD (2011), social cohesion is highly relevant for inclusive
growth and societies are considered cohesive when they are
“. . . stable, safe and just, and are based on the promotion and
protection of all human rights, as well as on non-discrimination,
tolerance, respect for diversity, equality of opportunity, solidarity,
security and participation of all people, including disadvantaged
and vulnerable groups and persons.” (OECD, 2011, p. 53). The
measures across the three studies reflect different aspects of this
definition by focusing on participation of all people, including
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and persons (Study 1), on
solidarity and equality of opportunity (Studies 2a and 2b), and on
non-discrimination, tolerance, and respect for diversity (Study 3).
The Present Research
The present research aims to complement and extend prior
theorizing and research in several ways: First, going beyond
obesity-specific stigmatization and discrimination (Puhl and
Brownell, 2001; Puhl and Luedicke, 2012; Flint and Snook, 2014;
Sikorski et al., 2015; Flint et al., 2016), the current research
proposes and tests that diverse health-related behaviors, to the
extent that they have a moral connotation, can and will serve
to divide people. Second, going beyond consequences of moral
convictions for interindividual interactions (e.g., Haidt et al.,
2003; Wright et al., 2008; Skitka et al., 2015), the current research
proposes and tests important intergroup dynamics which are
thought to result from moralization, and which are thought to
undermine social cohesion. In the following, I present results
from four survey studies that measured health moralization,
stigmatization, and different aspects of social cohesion. All
studies tested the same basic hypothesis, namely that health
moralization undermines social cohesion through stigmatization
of others who do not conform to a health-related norm. Study 1
was conducted among a student sample, Studies 2a and 2b among
adult samples, and Study 3 among employees. Below, I provide a
detailed overview over the measures, after which I will elaborate
on each study’s method in terms of recruitment, response rate,
and compilation of the sample reported here. Finally, I will
present descriptive statistics, and the results of the mediation
analyses testing the key hypothesis for all studies. I will conclude
by summarizing the results using meta-analysis following Goh
et al. (2016).
Overview Over the Variables
Health Moralization
The extent to which respondents perceived health as a moral issue
was examined in all studies. The wording of the items varied
slightly across studies in order to adapt the items to the respective
study contexts. However, the essence of the items was the same
in all studies, namely whether respondents thought of health as
something that is obligatory and as harming others when not
conformed to (Rozin, 1999; Mulder, 2008). Appendix A provides
an overview over the variables used in the studies reported below.
Stigmatization
The extent to which respondents stigmatized, thus ascribed
negative traits to, others who deviate from the health norm, was
examined in all studies. The wording of the items varied across
studies according to the respective study contexts. These items
were adapted from prior research on stigmatization, specifically
from Crandall’s (1994) work on fat stigma. Stigmatization
referred to smokers in Studies 1 and 2a, to people with overweight
in Study 2b, and to people with unhealthy lifestyles in Study 3.
Social Cohesion
Building on the OECD’s (2011) definition of social cohesion,
different aspects of social cohesion were measured across studies.
Study 1 focused on inclusion, Studies 2a and 2b focused on
solidarity and equal treatment, and Study 3 focused on inclusion,
non-discrimination, and non-exclusion. Below I introduce the
measures in detail.
In Study 1, the focus was on inclusion. Social inclusion is
often measured in terms of preferences for individual interaction,
for instance by asking respondents whether they would agree
having an obese person marrying into their family, or having
a mentally ill person living in their neighborhood (Sikorski
et al., 2015). Given the aim of the current research to illustrate
the impact of health moralization on a societal level, however,
Study 1 operationalized social inclusion in terms of respondents’
perceived overlap between those conforming to and those
deviating from the moral norm, as well as between society and
both groups of citizens using the intergroup item of the Inclusion
of Others into the Self scale (IOS, Schubert and Otten, 2002).
After extensive testing, this item was found to be an “easily
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applicable, comprehensive, and very sensitive assessment of the
salient self-categorization at a social level” (Schubert and Otten,
2002, p. 373). The item metaphorically maps intergroup relations
onto the spatial dimension, thereby capturing central aspects
of relations between groups in society. Specifically, the pictorial
IOS was used to measure perceived overlap between smokers
and non-smokers, smokers and society, non-smokers and society,
ill people and healthy people, ill people and society, as well
as healthy people and society (from 1 = no overlap at all, to
7 = almost complete overlap). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
with principal axis factoring (PAF) with direct oblimin rotation
revealed four factors with eigenvalues > 1. The total variance
explained was 47.85%. The moralization items loaded on one
factor (9.07% explained variance), and the anti-smoker attitudes
items (22.45% explained variance) loaded on another factor. The
IOS items (reflecting the dependent variable) loaded on two
factors. Specifically, the items referring to inclusion of smokers/ill
people with non-smokers/healthy people/society loaded on one
factor (12.48% explained variance), while the items referring
to inclusion of non-smokers/healthy people and society loaded
on another factor (3.85% explained variance). Based on these
results, the following scales were computed: Moralization of
health (α = 0.73), anti-smoker attitudes (α = 0.79), inclusion
of deviants (α = 0.74) and inclusion of conformers (r = 0.52,
p< 0.001).
In Studies 2a and 2b, the focus was on solidarity and equal
treatment. Three constructs were measured, namely respondents’
willingness to show solidarity, their expectation of others showing
solidarity, and their endorsement of unequal treatment of
deviants from the health norm. Specifically, respondents were
asked to indicate to what extent they thought different groups
of deviants should pay more health insurance compared to
conformers to the health norm. On a seven-point scale, 1
indicated ill people, smokers, overweight people, and people
with unhealthy lifestyles, 4 reflected respondents’ perception that
both groups should pay an equal amount, and 7 indicated that
healthy people, non-smokers, people with normal weight, and
people with healthy lifestyles should pay more. This measure
was mean-centered, such that the resulting scale reflected the
endorsement of equal payment by zero, and endorsement of
deviants paying more by higher values. Overall, the measured
constructs were thus coded in a way that higher values reflect
greater (expectations of) solidarity and greater endorsement of
equality.
For both studies, EFA with PAF with direct oblimin rotation
revealed five factors with eigenvalues > 1. Two items loaded on
the factor health moralization (2.59 and 6.32% explained variance
for Study 2a and 2b, respectively), three items on anti-smoker
and anti-fat attitudes (6.18 and 10.61% explained variance for
Study 2a and 2b, respectively), four items on willingness to show
solidarity (8.83 and 27.16% explained variance for Study 2a and
2b, respectively), three items on expectations of solidarity (14.09
and 13.16% explained variance for Study 2a and 2b, respectively),
and four items on the factor pay more (28.29 and 3.01% explained
variance for Study 2a and 2b, respectively). Based on these results,
scales were computed for health moralization (r = 0.40, p< 0.001
and r = 0.40, p < 0.001 for Study 2a and 2b, respectively),
anti-smoker attitudes (α = 0.74, Study 2a), anti-fat attitudes
(α = 0.79, Study 2b), willingness to show solidarity (α = 0.87
and α = 0.86 for Study 2a and 2b, respectively), expectation of
others showing solidarity with self (α = 0.86 and α = 0.79 for
Study 2a and 2b, respectively), and respondents’ endorsement of
unequal treatment of deviants from the health norm (α = 0.79
and α = 0.79, for Study 2a and 2b, respectively).
In Study 3, the focus was on inclusion and equal treatment.
Respondents’ perception that colleagues with healthy and
unhealthy lifestyles belong to the same rather than to
different groups was measured with four items adapted
from Gaertner et al. (1993). In order to avoid social desirability
effects, respondents were not asked whether they engage in
discrimination and exclusion themselves. Instead, respondents
were asked to indicate their agreement with statements such as
“Colleagues with unhealthy lifestyles are often treated unfairly
in the work place.” Perceived discrimination and exclusion of
colleagues with unhealthy lifestyles were measured with five and
three items (adapted from Kesseler et al., 1999 and Morrison
et al., 1999, respectively). In order to keep interpretation of the
constructs comparable across studies, the items referring to
discrimination and exclusion were reverse coded. Thus, higher
values of the scales in this study reflect the perception of being
one group (categorization), of equal treatment (discrimination
recoded), and of inclusion (exclusion recoded). EFA with
PAF with direct oblimin rotation revealed five factors with
eigenvalues > 1. Four items loaded on the factor health
moralization (8.06% explained variance), seven items on negative
attitudes toward people with unhealthy lifestyles (34.77%
explained variance), five items on discrimination (4.65 explained
variance), four items on categorization (5.89% explained
variance), and three items on exclusion (3.80% explained
variance). Based on these results, scales were computed for
health moralization (α = 0.75), negative attitudes toward
colleagues with an unhealthy lifestyle (α = 0.85), perceived
discrimination of colleagues with unhealthy lifestyles (α = 0.86),
categorization (α = 0.78), and perceived exclusion of colleagues
with unhealthy lifestyles (α = 0.86).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study 1
The study was conducted in the lab of the author’s faculty.
In order to not discriminate, the study was not advertised
as inviting non-smokers in particular. In total, 271 students
came to the lab for participation in the study in exchange
for course credit. Respondents were seated in separate cubicles
where they were presented with the questionnaire through a
computer. Respondents were informed that the survey was
concerned with their opinions about health and lifestyle, that
participation in the study was voluntary, that their individual
responses would be completely anonymous and that filling in the
questionnaire would take approximately 10 min. Based on this
information, respondents were asked to give informed consent.
Before proceeding to the questionnaire, respondents answered
the following question: “Do you consider yourself a smoker
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or a non-smoker?” (1 = “I consider myself a smoker,” 2 = “I
consider myself a non-smoker”). Based on respondents’ self-
reported categorization, only those who considered themselves
non-smokers were presented with the measures reported here.
Respondents who identified as smokers (N = 39) were redirected
to a study that investigated the extent to which those who deviate
from a health norm (i.e., smokers) feel morally judged by others
and how this affects their motivation to conform to the health
norm (i.e., quit smoking) in the future. Two-hundred-thirty-two
students self-identified as non-smokers (135 female, 97 male;
Mage = 22.22, SDage = 2.70) and filled in the questionnaire as
presented above.
Study 2a
Respondents were recruited from a panel about public transport.
A randomly selected sample of 4310 people from this panel
received an invitation to participate in a survey about health and
lifestyle. The invitation explicitly stressed that this survey was
conducted by the author’s university and that participation was
voluntary. The questionnaire could be accessed through a link
provided in the email. The study was presented using the online
survey tool Qualtrics. Upon starting the study, respondents were
informed that their individual responses would be completely
anonymous and that filling in the questionnaire would take
approximately 10 min. Based on this information, respondents
were asked to give informed consent before proceeding to the
questionnaire. In total, 1100 people started the questionnaire,
reflecting a response rate of 25.52%. Before proceeding to the
measures, respondents answered the following question: “Do
you consider yourself a smoker or a non-smoker?” (1 = “I
consider myself a smoker,” 2 = “I consider myself a non-smoker”).
Based on respondents’ self-reported categorization, only those
who considered themselves non-smokers were presented with the
measures reported here. Respondents who identified as smokers
(N = 112) were redirected to a study that investigated the extent
to which those who deviate from a health norm feel morally
judged by others and how this affects their motivation to conform
to the health norm in the future. The results for this sample
are currently being written up. Of the 955 respondents who
identified as non-smokers, 189 filled in less than one third of the
questionnaire and were therefore disregarded for data analysis.
This resulted in a sample of 766 non-smokers (365 female, 401
male; Mage = 57.85, SDage = 14.17), whose answers are reported
here.
Study 2b
Respondents were recruited from a panel about public transport.
A randomly selected sample of 4310 people from this panel
received an invitation to participate in a survey about health and
lifestyle. The invitation explicitly stressed that this survey was
conducted by the author’s university and that participation was
voluntary. The questionnaire could be accessed through a link
provided in the email. The study was presented using the online
survey tool Qualtrics. Upon starting the study, respondents were
informed that their individual responses would be completely
anonymous and that filling in the questionnaire would take
approximately 10 min. Based on this information, respondents
were asked to give informed consent before proceeding to the
questionnaire. In total, 1300 people started the questionnaire,
reflecting a response rate of 30.16%. Before proceeding to the
measures, respondents answered the following question: Would
you consider yourself as . . .” (1 = A person with normal weight,
2 = A person with a little overweight, 3 = A person with
overweight, 4 = A person with a lot of overweight). Of the
sample, 455 (43.1%) identified as persons with normal weight,
352 (33.3%) identified as persons with a little overweight, 212
(20.1%) identified as persons with overweight, and 37 (3.5%)
identified as person with a lot of overweight. Respondents who
identified as persons with overweight and a lot of overweight
(N = 249) were redirected to a study that investigated the extent
to which those who deviate from a health norm feel morally
judged by others and how this affects their motivation to conform
to the health norm in the future. The results for this sample
are currently being written up. For the purpose of the present
paper, a data-file was compiled of respondents self-identifying
as having normal weight and a little overweight, and from this
sample, only those respondents were included in the data analysis
who were considered as having normal weight based on a BMI
smaller than 25. This cut-off value left n = 447 respondents for
data analysis. Note that of these 447 respondents with objectively
normal weight based on BMI < 25, 74 (16.6%) categorized
themselves as having a little overweight. Similarly, of the 265
respondents who were objectively overweight as indicated by a
BMI > 25, 35 (8.6%), categorized themselves as a person with
normal weight. The final sample consisted of 447 respondents
with normal weight (BMI < 25; N = 447; 223 female, 224 male;
Mage = 56.43, SDage = 14.94).
Study 3
The study was conducted among German employees.
Respondents were recruited through a snowball system
using social media and the professional network of a research
assistant. In total, 293 people started the questionnaire.
Respondents were informed that the survey was concerned
with their opinions about health and lifestyle at work, that
participation in the study was voluntary, that their individual
responses would be completely anonymous and that filling in
the questionnaire would take approximately 10 min. Based
on this information, respondents were asked to give informed
consent before proceeding to the questions. Respondents filling
in less than one third of the questionnaire were disregarded
for analysis. Note that in Study 3, respondents’ status in terms
of conforming to or deviating from the norm of having a
healthy lifestyle was more ambiguous than in Studies 1, 2a,
and 2b because no pre-screening was employed. In order to
minimize this ambiguity and maximize comparability of Study
3 with the previous studies, additional analyses were carried
out. Specifically, respondents indicated whether they considered
their own lifestyle as healthy on a five-point scale from 1 (very
unhealthy) over 3 (neither unhealthy nor healthy) to 5 (very
healthy). On average, respondents considered their lifestyle as
healthy (M = 3.63, SD = 0.74), which was significantly above
the midpoint of the scale, t(189) = 11.84, p < 0.001. Of the
overall sample, 123 respondents considered their lifestyle as
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healthy and very healthy, and 67 respondents considered their
lifestyle as neither healthy nor unhealthy and as unhealthy.
No respondent considered their lifestyle as very unhealthy. In
order to keep the comparability between studies intact, only
respondents considering their lifestyles healthy and very healthy
were retained for analysis, resulting in a final sample of 123
respondents (82 female, 41 male; Mage = 36.80, SDage = 15.10;
Mtenure = 8.42, SDtenure = 10.92).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for moralization, negative attitudes toward
those who deviate from a health norm and indicators of
social cohesion can be found in Table 1. In general, levels
of moralization were similar across studies. In order to gain
more insights into the prevalence of moralization, I have treated
agreement and strong agreement with the statements referring
to health moralization as high levels of moralization; neutral,
disagreement and strong disagreement were treated as moderate
to low levels of moralization. This results in very similar
percentages of respondents strongly moralizing health across
studies, namely 22.80, 24.00, 21.00, and 20.30% in Studies 1, 2a,
2b, and 3, respectively. Figure 1 provides an overview over the
proportions.
Levels of stigmatization as well as the social cohesion
indicators were also similar across studies. In Study 1,
respondents perceived those deviating from the health norm
to be significantly less included with society and with their
group of conformers than those conforming to the health norm,
t(231) = −0.14.42, p < 0.001. In Studies 2a and 2b, respondents’
level of wanting to show solidarity was somewhat lower than their
expectations of solidarity. This makes sense theoretically, since
respondents are conforming to the health norm, and thus might
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for Moralization, Stigmatization, and Social
Cohesion indicators.
Study 1 Study 2a Study 2b Study 3
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Moralization 3.16 (0.78) 3.13 (0.81) 3.08 (0.83) 3.20 (0.81)




Solidarity 2.51 (0.79) 2.43 (0.80)
Expectation 3.66 (0.72) 3.71 (0.64)
Equal Paymentc 1.73 (0.86) 1.75 (0.87)
Categorization 3.94 (0.71)
Equal Treatment 4.01 (0.78)
InclusionDa 3.97 (0.77)
a Inclusion of those deviating from the health norm; b Inclusion of those conforming
to the health norm; cMean indicates deviation from zero, with zero reflecting
endorsement of equal treatment. Higher values indicate greater endorsement of
deviants paying more than conformers.
feel entitled to solidarity from others while feeling less compelled
to showing solidarity with those deviating from the health norm.
However, the different mean levels might also simply be due to
the fact that the targets of the questions differed; while showing
solidarity referred to solidarity with those deviating from the
health norm in particular, expecting solidarity referred to “others”
in general. Respondents in both Study 2a and 2b endorsed higher
payments of deviants significantly more than equal payment,
t(765) = 55.93, p< 0.001 and t(446) = 42.17, p< 0.001. Indicators
of social cohesion in Study 3 showed similar levels as those in the
other studies.
Mediation Analyses
In order to test the key hypothesis of this research that health
moralization impairs social cohesion through stigmatization of
those deviating from the health-related norm, simple mediations
were run with z-standardized variables using model 4 with 5000
re-samples (pre-defined, PROCESS macro, Hayes, 2012). For ease
of exposition and in order to avoid alpha error accumulation, the
social cohesion indicators were collapsed into one scale in those
studies that used more than one indicator. This was done in such
a way that higher values in social cohesion indicators reflect more
inclusion, more solidarity, and more equal treatment. Specifically,
Study 1 had only inclusion as indicator and thus remained
unchanged. Studies 2a and 2b had three indicators, of which
two referred to solidarity and one referred to equal treatment.
Collapsing across those three indicators resulted in a reliable
scale of 11 items (α = 0.81 and α = 0.81 in Study 2a and 2b,
respectively). Higher values of the resulting scale reflect greater
social cohesion. Study 3 had three indicators of social cohesion,
of which two referred to exclusion and one referred to unequal
treatment. Collapsing across these three indicators resulted in
a reliable scale of 12 items (α = 0.86). Higher values of the
resulting scale reflect more inclusion and more equal treatment.
The first relationship of interest was the mediator model, thus
the relationship between health moralization and stigmatization
(MS). Table 2 provides an overview over the mediator model
across studies. As can be seen, health moralization was associated
with significantly greater stigmatization of those deviating from
a health-related norm in all studies, irrespective of whether the
norm referred to smoking, weight or lifestyle.
The next relationship of interest was the dependent variable
model, thus the association between moralization and social
cohesion (MSC) when taking into account stigmatization as
a potential mediator. Table 3 provides an overview over the
dependent variable model across studies. Specifically, social
cohesion was significantly and negatively associated with
stigmatization in all studies, irrespective of stigmatization
referring to smokers, overweight people, or people with an
unhealthy lifestyle. Health moralization remained a significant
predictor of social cohesion in Studies 2a and 2b, but not in
Studies 1 and 3. In accordance with these findings, a direct
negative effect of moralization on social cohesion was evident in
Studies 2a and 2b, CI95% (−0.294, −0.148) and CI95% (−0.329,
−0.149), respectively. By contrast, no direct effect of moralization
on social cohesion was evident in Studies 1 and 3, CI95% (−0.197,
0.055) and CI95% (−0.203, 0.078), respectively. Importantly, the
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FIGURE 1 | Prevalence of strong vs. moderate to low health moralization across studies.
hypothesized indirect effect of health moralization on social
cohesion through stigmatization was evident in all studies.
Table 4 provides an overview over the corresponding statistics.
Meta-Analysis
Finally, in order to provide a more comprehensive overview and
to assess the overall reliability of the reported relationships, I
conducted a mini meta-analysis following the recommendations
of Goh et al. (2016). Specifically, separate analyses were
performed for the relationship between the predictor and the
mediator (health moralization and stigmatization), between the
predictor and the dependent variable (health moralization and
social cohesion) and between the mediator and the dependent
variable (stigmatization and social cohesion, SSC). Table 5
summarizes the findings. Fixed effects were used in which the
mean effect size (in this case the mean correlation) was weighted
by sample size. All correlations were Fisher’s z transformed
(see Mrz in Table 5), and then converted back to correlations
for presentation (see Mr in Table 5). Across the four studies,
the associations between health MS, health MSC, and SSC
were highly significant. This allows for some confidence in
the findings reported here. Figure 2 summarizes the meta-
analytic associations between the predictor, the mediator, and the
dependent variable.
TABLE 2 | Statistics for mediator model (relationship between moralization and
stigmatization).
ba (SE) t F(df) R2
Study 1 0.21 (0.06) 3.22∗∗ 10.40 (1,230)∗∗ 0.043
Study 2a 0.45 (0.03) 13.99∗∗∗ 176.94 (1,764)∗∗∗ 0.188
Study 2b 0.36 (0.04) 8.76∗∗∗ 76.68 (1,445)∗∗∗ 0.147
Study 3 0.31 (0.09) 3.28∗∗ 10.73 (1,120)∗∗ 0.082
aZ-standardized regression coefficients; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
I started out with the proposition that persuasion concerning
health and lifestyle is relevant for intra- and intergroup dynamics
because it leads to the emergence of new moral norms on a
societal level. Specifically, I suggested that public discourse about
health that highlights own responsibility and harm inflicted
on others, together with the strong association of health with
self-control and the greater prevalence of poor health outcomes
among marginalized groups in society all operate to facilitate
lasting moralization of health (Rozin, 1999). Based on insights
from moral psychology, I expected health moralization to be
associated with stigmatization of citizens deviating from the
moral health norm, and with decreased levels of social cohesion.
TABLE 3 | Statistics for dependent variable model (relationship between
moralization and social cohesion while controlling for stigmatization).
ba (SE) t F(df) R2
Study 1
Moralization −0.07 (0.06) −1.11 13.00 (2,229)∗∗∗ 0.102
Stigmatization −0.30 (0.06) −4.64∗∗∗
Study 2a
Moralization −0.22 (0.04) −5.97∗∗∗ 76.82 (2,763)∗∗∗ 0.168
Stigmatization −0.26 (0.04) −6.99∗∗∗
Study 2b
Moralization −0.24 (0.05) −5.22∗∗∗ 33.09 (2,444)∗∗∗ 0.130
Stigmatization −0.18 (0.05) −3.76∗∗∗
Study 3
Moralization −0.18 (0.08) −2.13∗ 15.98 (2,119)∗∗∗ 0.212
Stigmatization −0.35 (0.08) −4.40∗∗∗
aZ-standardized regression coefficients; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Social cohesion indicators (dependent variables) are inclusion (Studies 1 and 3),
solidarity (Studies 2a and 2b), and endorsement of equal treatment (Studies 2a,
2b, and 3).
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TABLE 4 | Statistics for the indirect effect of moralization on social cohesion
through stigmatization.
ba (SE) CI95% [LLCI, ULCI] Z
Study 1 −0.06 (0.02) [−0.121, −0.027] −2.61∗∗
Study 2a −0.12 (0.03) [−0.166, −0.064] −6.24∗∗∗
Study 2b −0.07 (0.02) [−0.115, −0.028] −3.43∗∗∗
Study 3 −0.11 (0.04) [−0.217, −0.039] −2.59∗∗
aZ-standardized regression coefficients; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 5 | Associations of health moralization with stigmatization (MS) and social
cohesion (MSC), and stigmatization with social cohesion (SSC).
N MS MSC SSC
Study 1 232 0.21∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.30∗∗∗
Study 2a 766 0.45∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
Study 2b 447 0.36∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
Study 3 123 0.31∗∗ −0.18∗ −0.39∗∗∗
Mrz 0.40 −0.21 −0.25
Mr 0.38 −0.21 −0.25
Combined Z 15.83∗∗∗ −8.25∗∗∗ −10.10∗∗∗
CI95% 0.338, 0.432 −.253, −0.158 −0.297, −0.204
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001. Indicators of social cohesion were social inclusion (Study
1), willingness to be solidary, expectations of others showing solidarity, perception
that deviants should pay more (Studies 2a and 2b), categorization, exclusion,
and discrimination (Study 3). Mr = fixed-effects weighted mean correlation across
studies. Mrz = Fisher’s-z transformed correlations for normalization. Combined
Z = Summary p-value for all studies based on Stouffer’s Z test, together with
confidence intervals.
Four studies provided converging support for this notion. The
more those conforming to a health norm – non-smokers, normal
weight people, and employees with healthy lifestyles – moralized
health or lifestyle, the more they stigmatized those deviating
from the norm – smokers, overweight people, ill people, and
employees with an unhealthy lifestyle – which was associated
with less inclusion, lower solidarity, and endorsement of unequal
treatment. All of these outcomes are indicators of social cohesion,
which is considered highly relevant for societies’ inclusive growth
(OECD, 2011). The predicted processes were observed across
samples varying in age, nationality, and context.
Findings align with a body of research demonstrating that
obese people are stigmatized and discriminated against in
numerous settings such as schools, public spaces, and the
workplace (Puhl and Brownell, 2001; Puhl and Luedicke, 2012;
Flint and Snook, 2014; Sikorski et al., 2015; Flint et al., 2016).
However, they valuably extend prior theorizing and research
by demonstrating processes undermining social cohesion on a
variety of health-related aspects. Thus, going beyond obesity-
specific stigmatization and discrimination, the main message
of the current research is that any health-related condition or
behavior that acquires a moral connotation can and will serve
to divide people. Further, going beyond consequences of moral
convictions for interindividual interactions (e.g., Haidt et al.,
2003; Wright et al., 2008; Skitka et al., 2015), the current research
highlights the intergroup dynamics flowing from moralization by
stimulating a supposedly legitimate division of society into those
conforming to and those deviating from emergent moral norms.
Some Thoughts on Causality
While the findings reported here align with the theoretical
rationale introduced, the employed research designs do not allow
for causal inferences about the relationships under scrutiny.
Based on prior theorizing about the consequences of moralization
(e.g., Rozin, 1999), I have predicted that those who deviate
from a moral norm will be perceived negatively, as reflected in
increased stigmatization levels (e.g., Crandall, 1994). Increased
levels of stigmatization, in turn, serve as a legitimization for
unequal treatment and exclusion (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993;
Wright et al., 2008; Sikorski et al., 2015). As outlined in the
supplementary analyses, the mediation models work equally
well when the mediator stigmatization and the dependent
variable social cohesion are switched. What does this mean?
Indeed, both processes are plausible. The reasoning guiding
my research reflects decision-stage models of attribution (e.g.,
Heider, 1958), which conceive of observers as “naïve scientists.”
In an attempt to arrive at conclusions about the causality of
events, observers are thought to first assign controllability, which
is strongly associated with morality – if an outcome is considered
controllable, someone failing to achieve the outcome will be seen
as immoral (e.g., Weiner, 1986). In a second step, observers
assign responsibility, which is reflected in stigmatization. In the
final stage, blame is assigned, which is reflected in exclusion,
little solidarity, and discrimination as described in the present
research.
However, stigma researchers have also suggested that –
in particular in non-laboratory contexts – people might not
necessarily go through the stages in order (Shaver, 1985). This
is because “an attribution of moral responsibility is a social
judgment based on personal ethical standards against which the
agent’s behavior is measured” (cf. Mantler et al., 2003, p. 142).
Put differently, when an observer holds specific ethical or moral
standards, they might hold strong preexisting bias (Alicke, 2000;
cf. Mantler et al., 2003). They would then first focus on the
blameworthiness of the agent’s deviating behavior. In this case,
observers would first “decide” that, for instance, a smoker or
an overweight person should pay more health insurance. Only
then would observers go backward through the stages, so as to
confirm their judgment and their preexisting personal bias, for
instance by thinking that smokers and overweight people are
lazy and lacking self-control. Thus, stigmatization would come
second in the process and would follow on unequal treatment as
a post-hoc legitimization for this unequal treatment. Supporting
this sequence, Mantler et al. (2003, p. 150) found that in their
studies, “the attribution sequence became increasingly influenced
by personal biases and social attitudes.” This aligns with the
finding that the mediation models reported here work equally
well when mediator and dependent variable are switched.
In a practical sense, the above considerations suggest that
those conforming to a moral norm might either first stigmatize
and then discriminate against those deviating from the moral,
or discriminate first and then stigmatize those deviating from
a moral norm. For those being excluded or discriminated
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of meta-analytic associations between the predictor, the mediator, and the dependent variable.
against, order will arguably matter little. Rather, the question
of causality might be most relevant in terms of identifying
the most promising routes for interventions. In terms of
interventions, being aware that the moralization process can
unfold both ways is valuable: It suggests that both attenuating
accounts of responsibility for poor health outcomes in public
discourse is relevant, and discouraging exclusion, discrimination,
and different treatment is relevant. To the extent that health
is presented in moral terms – as has been demonstrated
repeatedly (e.g., Weiner et al., 1988; Weiner, 1995; Rozin, 1999;
Townend, 2009) – it is made blameworthy purely by association
of one stage with the other. Morality implies controllability,
controllability implies responsibility, and responsibility implies
blameworthiness (e.g., Weiner, 1995; Mantler et al., 2003).
Specifically, it seems important to investigate interventions,
communication styles, and framings of persuasive messages
that lower the automatic coupling of health with morality
through presuppositions of responsibility and controllability
(e.g., Weiner, 1995; Mantler et al., 2003). At the same time,
and acknowledging the fact that people might exclude others
first and only afterward engage in legitimizing cognitions such
as stigmatization, exclusion and unequal treatment of people
deviating from a health norm should be discouraged. Unequal
treatment and exclusion of citizens not conforming to a health
norm needs to be acknowledged and discouraged. This is an
important task particularly in relation to governments’ and
communities’ striving toward healthier populations, as the
example about smoke-free inner cities below illustrates.
Who Is Responsible for Health?
What the current research highlights is that, in their attempt
to do good for their citizens, communities might worsen
existing disparities. Consider the established difference in health
outcomes along the lines of socio-economic status (e.g., Adler
and Ostrove, 1999): The more income and the better education
someone has, the healthier this person will be. While the
causes of this relationship are not conclusively determined, the
consequences can easily be drafted: Those who are already
suffering from poor health outcomes, less healthy nutrition,
and smoke in larger numbers will face exclusion, less solidarity,
and calls for paying more health insurance. Proportionally,
the group that will be most negatively affected by increasing
health moralization are citizens with low socio-economic status.
A city in the northern part of the Netherlands is striving to
be the first smoke-free city of the Netherlands. While in and
of itself, this sounds like a commendable goal, it also implies
that disproportionally many poorer inhabitants will not be able
to go into the inner city anymore. This shows that a much
more nuanced approach to public health is warranted. It also
underlines a further problem of health moralization: While it
burdens citizens with the full responsibility for their health
outcomes, it simultaneously frees governments and institutions
from taking their responsibility for citizens’ health outcomes and
social cohesion.
One example that might illustrate such a process can be found
in the recent liberalization of the European sugar market. This
liberalization will lead to higher usage of sugars in food that
were previously strictly regulated within the European Union,
such as isoglucose and high fructose corn syrup. Because these
sugars are associated with diabetes and obesity, researchers have
issued explicit warnings that the European Union “can expect
to see a dramatic increase in obesity and diabetes” (Jacobsen,
2016). This example might reflect a shift of governments’
responsibility to citizens’ responsibility, where loosening the
regulations for sugar aligns with the conviction that consumers
are personally responsible for buying or not buying products
containing the syrup. Thus, the moralized discourse about health
and lifestyle potentially worsens the problems that should be
tackled, by freeing policy makers and corporations from taking
responsibility for the people. The current research thus points
to the specific responsibility of governments, policy makers, and
institutions to carefully consider their communication of norms
so as not to inadvertently divide society. The Dutch case provides
an example for this notion: A core feature of the proclaimed
participatory society is solidarity with others (Troonrede,
2013). As the studies presented here unanimously demonstrate,
perceiving health as a moral norm actually undermines exactly
this goal. Rather than showing more solidarity, a divided society
surfaces characterized by endorsement of unequal treatment,
exclusion of others and less solidarity.
The role of institutions and governments in communicating
has been documented by prior research. For instance,
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Latner et al. (2007) showed that the media, television, and
written press contribute to developing and maintaining
stigmatizing attitudes toward obese children. Relatedly, Rich
and Evans (2005) criticize the social construction and public
representation of certain facts and knowledge about obesity,
while “on closer inspection few such certainties are to be found”
(p. 341). Thus, public discourse has been shown to create concern
and “moral panic” regarding obesity (Flint et al., 2016), which
feeds into stigmatization and discrimination of obese children
and adults. The current research shows that obesity is certainly
not the only health-related domain affected by such discourse,
but that other domains are equally affected. Worryingly, such
domains can be quite vague, such as when a multi-faceted
construct as lifestyle is concerned, or downright unfair, such
as when sick people are concerned. Health moralization might
elicit an overly exclusive lens pushing those who conform into
condemning everyone who appears to defy the norm. This would
suggest that the impact of moralized discourse and persuasion is
more severe and wide-spread than thought, with stigmatization
and discrimination then affecting many more people in society
besides overweight people.
Limitations and Routes for Future
Research
In light of the above considerations, a promising route for future
research concerns systematic investigations into the antecedents
of moralization. Prior research demonstrated that people can
construe almost any issue in moral and in non-moral terms
when asked to do so (Van Bavel et al., 2012), and that people
differ regarding which issues they construe in moral or non-
moral terms (Wright et al., 2008). However, to the best of
my knowledge, systematic insights into how and why people
end up seeing some issues through a moral lens and others as
preferential are missing. Indeed, Skitka (personal communication
with the author), deemed the question of antecedents of moral
convictions “the million-dollar question.” In the meantime, some
research has shown that moral emotions such as disgust can elicit
moralization (Wisneski and Skitka, 2017), thereby supporting
Rozin’s (1999) proposition that moralization comes about
through both cognitive and emotional routes. Note that, similar
to the above discussion of decision-stage models of attribution,
also here it appears that moralization elicits disgust just as disgust
can elicit moralization. Since the controllability dimension plays
an essential role in eliciting moral emotions such as disgust,
contempt, and outrage (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), it
appears to provide a potent lever to prevent stigmatization and
the unwarranted impairment of social cohesion both through a
cognitive and an affective route.
While experimental research designs would valuably
complement the survey studies reported here, future research
should also engage in longitudinal and cross-cultural research. I
have based my theoretical reasoning on plausible assumptions
about the increasing moralization of health, which are supported
by prior research (e.g., Rozin, 1999; Townend, 2009). However,
whether moralization really is increasing and at which rate
and what differences exist between cultures regarding health
moralization cannot be addressed based on the research designs
employed in the current research. I have shown that among
diverse samples from different national and age backgrounds,
the prevalence of moralization was about 20 percent. Thus,
one fifth of respondents seemed to moralize health at high
levels. First, it seems rewarding to examine what differentiates
the 20 percent of high moralizers from the rest. Why do some
people moralize health and lifestyle while others feel no urge
to do so? Obviously, this question ties in with the search into
antecedents of moralization noted above. The roughly 20
percent of high moralizers also suggests that the effects we have
seen in the studies reported here are not mere similarity vs.
dissimilarity effects where people discriminate against others
who are different from themselves. Future research might want to
investigate whether these prevalence rates replicate across diverse
nations and cultures, but might also use these experimentally. In
a sample that is repeatedly exposed to moralizing messages about
health, the proportion of high moralizers should increase over
time. By the same logic, the proportion of high moralizers might
decrease after repeated exposure to non-moralizing messages
about health, thereby probably identifying valuable routes for
interventions.
Second, the question of causality might be addressed in a more
sophisticated way with longitudinal studies. It appears plausible
to assume that in contexts or cultures where health moralization
is still in its infancy, those conforming to the health norm will
go through the decision-stage models in the order reported
here. However, when health moralization is more widespread
and prevalent, the order might change and follow the reverse
path (as displayed in Appendix B), because personal biases
guide social judgment (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Mantler et al., 2003).
Finally, the current research might be valuably complemented by
research going beyond to self-reports and behavioral intentions.
Studies considering more objective measures and real behavior,
for instance, by measuring distance when sitting next to someone
deviating from a moral health-related norm (Haidt et al.,
2003; Wright et al., 2008), or cooperativeness and ability to
resolve conflicts in groups consisting of people conforming to
or deviating from a moral health-related norm (Skitka et al.,
2005) would be relevant next steps. Below, I highlight another
intriguing follow-up question concerning subjective construals of
health and lifestyle.
Subjective Construals of Health and
Lifestyle
Complementing and extending prior research, the current
research showed that own health and lifestyle are relevant for
predicting stigmatization and important indicators of social
cohesion. The studies reported here relied on self-reported,
more or less objective conformity to a health norm such as
non-smoking, being of normal weight, or having a healthy
lifestyle. However, these self-reports also give rise to a number
of intriguing questions. The most obvious one concerns the
question whether the perception that one’s health is good and
one’s own lifestyle is healthy is indeed grounded in reality.
Does the presumed consensus about what is healthy actually
find reflection in normal people’s construal of health? Further,
particularly lifestyle involves many different aspects, some of
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which people might weigh heavier than others. Thus, which
of these aspects do people rely on when deciding whether or
not their lifestyle is healthy? Lifestyle is a construct with many
different aspects concerning exercise, nutrition, sleep, alcohol
consumption, and so on. Surely, most people do better on some
of these aspects than on others. Thus, which weight do people
give to those aspects when considering their own, but also others,
lifestyles? If indeed people use their own lifestyle as a basis for
moralization, thus tend to moralize those attributes they fulfill
themselves (Pinker, 2008), then there should be great variation
in aspects of lifestyle used to stigmatize others. And, related to
the previous question, how would people evaluate others who
conform to some but deviate from other aspects of a healthy
lifestyle? What about the overweight person who exercises three
times a week and is a vegetarian? What about the smoker who
never drinks alcohol? What about the normal weight person who
drinks excessively and eats poorly? With the last description, the
typical person that comes to mind is a young adult, possibly
a student or young professional, and this summarizes a big
problem of health and lifestyle moralization: Many people
do nothing much for certain aspects of their lifestyle. Young
people for instance are on average slimmer and more healthy
than older adults, despite their well-known excessive alcohol
consume and poor eating habits during university. Thus, while
their health outcomes might be fine, their efforts into being
healthy might be negligible. This illustrates a problem inherent
to moralization, namely that often outcomes rather than effort
provide the foundation for moral judgment: People perceiving
others through a moral lens will rarely consider how many
attempts to losing weight or to quit smoking the other person has
made.
CONCLUSION
In providing first evidence for the negative consequences flowing
from health moralization, the present research shows that
governments’ good intentions in persuading entire populations
to live more healthily might come at a substantial cost, especially
when the discourse highlights morality. The moralization of
health and lifestyle undermines social cohesion by creating a
divide between those conforming to and those deviating from the
health norm. The current research complemented and extended
prior research by showing negative consequences of health
moralization on a variety of aspects (weight, smoking, lifestyle)
and on a societal level. At the same time, I have outlined a
number of promising routes for follow-up research that might
tackle some limitations of the studies presented here and that
can address important questions revolving around the impact of
health moralization at the individual, organizational, and societal
level. One rather urgent route for future research concerns the
consequences of health moralization on decision making among
policy makers. The conviction that health is a personal choice and
is under citizens’ control, as implied by its moralization, might
free policy makers and institutions from their responsibility
toward citizens. They might arrive at conclusions and make
decisions that ultimately affect citizens negatively, thereby
undermining social cohesion and the achievement of important
societal goals.
Admittedly, the implications of the present research sound
pessimistic. However, the insights provided here also lend
themselves for deriving some recommendations at the levels
of institutions, employers, and individual citizens. Firstly,
communicate about health and lifestyle in an inclusive way
that embraces gradations rather than either-or judgments. In
other words, avoid depicting health and lifestyle as something
absolute, and prefer to depict it as something people can gradually
get closer to. Secondly, avoid framing health and lifestyle in
terms of harm inflicted on others, and specifically avoid stressing
zero-sum conflicts as these are strongly associated with moral
exclusion (Opotow, 1990). Third, be aware of your own prejudice
and the foundations of your moral convictions. Consider how
much effort you have put into conforming to the norm of living
healthily. Also consider how much effort others have put into
living healthily, and try not to confuse outcome with effort.
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